



Notes from the Director

No. 2

16 May 1977

SMALL GROUP MEETINGS

As part of my efforts to learn more about our Agency and to identify matters which its employees consider important and meriting my personal attention, I have met with several small groups of representative employees both here at Headquarters and at our major training site. I want to do this to an even greater degree in the future, and I have initiated action throughout the Agency to organize such groups and to arrange the necessary scheduling.

It is my desire that the matters discussed in these meetings with me be determined by the members of the group involved and, to this end, I have asked that each group meet several times prior to meeting with me. At these meetings, the members can collectively identify those items which they believe are most worthy of discussion. What I hope will result from these meetings are ideas for constructive changes which can possibly improve the Agency or its product. I do not believe that any of us are interested in change for the sake of change alone or in hearing endless complaints for which no constructive solutions are offered. I am hopeful that future meetings will be as informative and constructive as those I already held, and that we will be able to develop some sound improvements as a result.

THE MOORE TRIAL

On 5 May 1977, a Federal jury found former CIA employee, Edwin G. Moore II, guilty of attempting to deliver information affecting the national security to the Soviet Union after he threw a package containing several Agency documents over the fence of the Soviet residence in Washington, D.C. Moore was also found guilty of four other charges relating to the unauthorized retention and theft of classified documents. Moore was arrested by the FBI on 22 December 1976 after he picked up what he believed to be the initial \$3,000 he had demanded from the Soviets in return for the package of documents. He had instructed the Soviets to deliver a second payment of \$197,000 later that

same day in exchange for additional documents. The rapid arrest and successful prosecution were the result of extremely close cooperation between the Agency, the FBI and the Department of Justice and demonstrated our commitment to fully prosecute any instances where an attempt is made, successful or not, to disclose classified Agency information to unauthorized recipients. Although the prosecution involved a public trial, the disclosure of names of covert Agency employees or other information which would damage sensitive intelligence sources and methods was avoided.

The Moore case, and particularly the background on Mr. Moore's CIA career, have already been the objects of vigorous study and analysis within the Agency. They will continue to be so. From what is known so far, it is probable that the case will lead in the future to some significant modifications in personnel processing and evaluation systems.

THE BOYCE TRIAL

After less than four hours deliberation, a U.S. District Court jury returned a guilty verdict against Christopher John Boyce, a former employee of an Agency contractor, TRW Systems, Inc., on 28 April 1977 on all eight counts of the indictment including violation of U.S. espionage statutes. The counts included conspiracy to transmit defense information to a foreign power, disclosure of classified information (Communications Intelligence), theft of U.S. Government property, and failure to register as an agent of a foreign power. Boyce was first employed by TRW in July 1974 and was authorized access to very sensitive U.S. Government and Agency classified information in November 1974. Boyce remained employed by TRW until 17 December 1976 when he voluntarily resigned.

Although the conviction of Boyce was not achieved without some damage to Agency sources and methods, this case clearly demonstrates our determination to protect sensitive intelligence information from unauthorized disclosure by aggressively seeking criminal prosecution whenever such action is warranted. As with the Moore case, the circumstances surrounding the Boyce case have and will continue to be subjected to thorough analysis and study by the Agency. Analysis to date has revealed several areas in relation to the Agency's industrial contracts and security practices which can and will be improved upon.

REMARKS OF AMBASSADOR HARLAN CLEVELAND, CIA AUDITORIUM, 10 MAY 1977


In his remarks Tuesday, Ambassador Cleveland addressed the issue of ethics and security in government. Secrecy, he said, is unquestionably necessary at times in both foreign and domestic affairs. However, because the need for secrecy can be easily rationalized, it is sometimes imposed for the

wrong reasons and can influence policy adversely. He argued that the smaller the circle of policy-makers who "need to know," the more unlikely dissenting opinion will be heard and a full range of options explored. The benefits of security must always be weighed in light of the national interest which is sometimes better served by free and open debate.

Regarding efforts to codify ethical standards for the actions of the Intelligence Community or any other government agency, he agreed the task was worth undertaking but was indeed difficult; that too broad standards would not be helpful to the person faced with a difficult decision, and too restrictive standards would have to be so encumbered with exceptions that they would also not be helpful. He suggested instead that we consider a question he uses to test whether or not a contemplated action meets his ethical standards:

If this action is held up to public scrutiny, will I still feel that it is what I should have done and how I should have done it?

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STANSFIELD TURNER
Director